Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13 ACDA-12 SY-05 EB-08 MCT-01 /098 W -------035041 262123Z /14

R 261230Z JAN 78 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO USMISSION USBERLIN INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5209 AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY PARIS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS - 1

TAGS: PORS, PGOV, BQG, AKB

SUBJECT: PRESENCE OF BGS IN BERLIN

REFS: (A) 77 USBER 3230; (B) 77 USBER 3131; (C) 77 BONN 18889 (PARA 8); (D) 75 BONN 5137;

(E) 75 BONN 5837; (F) 75 STATE 70838

SUMMARY: THE SUBJECT OF THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE IN BERLIN OF MEMBERS OF THE FRG'S BORDER PROTECTIVE SERVICE (BUNDESGRENZSCHUTZ "BGS") WAS DISCUSSED TRIPARTITELY BY ALLIED BONN GROUP REPS AT UK AND FRENCH REQUEST ON JANUARY 19. THE UK REP REPORTED THAT THE FCO IS PREPARED TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESENCE OF THE BGS IN BERLIN UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. THE FRENCH REP WAS NONCOMMITTAL AS TO FRENCH APPROVAL BUT IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A NEED FOR BGS ASSISTANCE THERE. THE US REP DREW FROM REF A. IT WAS AGREED TO QUERY THE MISSIONS IN BERLIN FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARAGRAPH 9. END SUMMARY

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1. ON JANUARY 19, THE ALLIED BONN GROUP REPS DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT TRIPARTITELY AT UK AND FRENCH SUGGESTION. FRENCH REP (RICHARD) SAID THAT THE BERLIN AUTHORITIES HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE REGARDING THE SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE LORENZ TRIAL (REF B) AND THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE BGS WAS DISCUSSED BY THE ALLIED MISSIONS . HE SAID

THAT THE POLICE DO NOT WANT ANY HELP IN GENERAL BUT THAT THEY DO IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THESE FALL INTO THREE AREAS:

A. PROTECTION OF PROMINENT PERSONALITIES WHO WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY BGS PERSONNEL WHO ARE DETAILED TO THE BKA. THIS DETAIL PLACES THEM UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE BKA, AND THROUGH THEM UNDER THE ULTIMATE UMBRELLA OF THE BERLIN POLICE. RICHARD SAID THAT THE BERLIN POLICE APPARENTLY DO NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO PROTECT ALL FRG PERSONALITIES WHO COME TO BERLIN.

- B. RADIO SIGNAL TRACING EQUIPMENT. THE IDEA WOULD BE TO CALL IN BGS, WHICH DOES NOT HAVE SUCH EQUIPMENT, WITH THREE POWER AUTHORIZATION.
- C. POSSIBLE NECESSITY TO CALL ON SPECIALISTS FROM THE BGS (GSG-9) IN THE CASE OF A HIGHJACKED AIRCRAFT BEING AT A BERLIN AIRPORT. RICHARD SAID THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN BERLIN AND THAT SOME BELIEVED THE SPECIAL EINSATZ KOMMANDO HAS THE CAPABILITY OF COVERING ALL POSSIBLE SITUATIONS.
- 2. UK REP (EYERS) SAID THAT THERE IS A CLEAR VIEW ON THE SUBJECT FROM THE FCO. SPECIFICALLY, THE FCO BELIEVES THAT ANY CONTINGENCY PLANNING SHOULD NOT INCLUDE THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PRESENCE OF BGS IN BERLIN IN ANY PUBLICLY AVOWED OR AVOWABLE FORM. BY IMPLICATION, EYERS SAID, THIS WOULD PERMIT THE PRESENCE OF A BGS IN BERLIN IN A CLANDESTINE FASHION. HE NOTED THAT IN 1975 IT WAS AGREED IN THE

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BONN GROUP THAT THE BGS WOULD BE USED AS TECHNICAL EXPERTS. HE SAID THIS WAS THE TYPE OF LINE HE WOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND. (COMMENT: EYERS WAS REFERRING TO THE TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS OF MARCH 28 AND 29, 1975, DESCRIBED IN REF D. WE HAVE SINCE INFORMED HIM OF THE FRENCH STATEMENT IN THE BONN GROUP MEETING ON APRIL 8, 1975, WHERE THE FRENCH REP SAID BGS PRESENCE IN BERLIN WOULD BE "PER SE ILLEGAL." REF E. END COMMENT)

- 3. US REP DREW FROM REF A TO PROVIDE FACTUAL INFORMATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BKA AND THE BGS AND NOTED THAT THE PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE MISSION IN BERLIN WOULD BE TO PERMIT THE PRESENCE OF THE BGS THERE UNDER CERTAIN EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES. (COMMENT: THE DEPARTMENT WAS ALSO PREPARED TO AUTHORIZE BGS PRESENCE IN BERLIN IN MARCH 1975. REF F.)
- 4. EYERS SAID THAT THE TYPE OF APPROACH HE WOULD PROPOSE IS AS FOLLOWS: (A) THERE ARE GOOD REASONS WHY THE BGS IS NOT PRESENT IN BERLIN. (B) HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE WRONG CONFIDENTIAL

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FOR THE ALLIES TO EXCLUDE ANY VALUABLE MEANS OF SOLVING TERRORIST PROBLEMS. (C) WHERE THESE MEANS ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN BERLIN BUT CAN BE PROVIDED BY THE ALLIES, THE ALLIES SHOULD DO SO. (D) IF IT IS IN FACT THE CASE THAT THE ALLIES CANNOT PROVIDE NECESSARY EXPERTISE OR EQUIPMENT, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE BGS TO PROVIDE IT CLANDESTINELY AND IN A FASHION TIGHTLY CONTROLLED BY THE ALLIES.

5. HE SAID THAT THERE IS A TENDENCY IN THE SENAT TO CONSIDER INVITING THE BGS IN IN ORDER THAT THE SEK DOES NOT HAVE TO BEAR THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY (CF. PARA 4 OF REF A) BUT EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE INTERNAL BERLIN POLITICAL FACTORS SHOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO PERSUADE THE ALLIES TO PERMIT THE BGS TO GO TO BERLIN. WHERE THE

REQUIREMENT OF SPECIALLY TRAINED PERSONNEL OR SPECIAL EQUIPMENT DOES NOT EXIST (I.E., IN THE THIRD CATEGORY, THAT OF PERSONAL PROTECTION), EYERS SAID HE SAW NO OBJECTION TO BGS PERSONNEL BEING IN BERLIN PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE ON LONG-TERM ASSIGNMENTS AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 1, REF A. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT THE FINAL DECISION WOULD REST WITH THE FCO.

6. EYERS SAID HE THOUGHT THE ALLIES AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN BERLIN HAVE THE NECESSARY ABILITY TO DEAL WITH MOST EMERGENCIES OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE. SPECIFICALLY, HE THOUGHT THAT THE SEK HAD THE ABILITY TO PERFORM THE SAME FUNCTIONS REGARDING THE STORMING OF AN AIRCRAFT AS DID THE GSG-9. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE ALLIED UNITS AVAILABLE TO PERFORM THE SAME FUNCTION. THE US REP AND RICHARD QUESTIONED WHETHER THE ALLIES DO HAVE THIS CAPABILITY AT PRESENT. IN ADDITION, BASED ON THE APPARENT NEED FOR FRG SIGNAL TRACING EQUIPMENT DURING THE CONFIDENTIAL

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1975 LORENZ KIDNAPPING, THE US REP QUESTIONED WHETHER THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT WAS AVAILABLE IN BERLIN.

- 7. IT WAS AGREED THAT ALL THREE REPS LACKED THE NECESSARY INFORMATION TO PROCEED WITH THIS QUESTION AND THAT WE SHOULD QUERY THE BERLIN MISSIONS FOR MORE INFORMATION.
- 8. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE FCO'S WILLINGNESS TO AGREE (AS IT WAS PREPARED TO DO IN 1975, REF D) TO BGS PRESENCE IN BERLIN UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THE LIGHT OF

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THE FRENCH BONN GROUP REP'S OPENNESS ON THE MATTER, THE ALLIED BONN GROUP REPS WILL PRESUMABLY RETURN TO THE QUESTION. WHILE WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PUSHING FOR CONTINGENCY APPROVAL (REF A, PARA 6), IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE DIALOGUE TO CONTINUE. ANYTHING RELEVANT WHICH USBER CAN PROVIDE, IN ADDITION TO THE HELPFUL INFORMATION IN REF A, WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

- 9. SPECIFICALLY, ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WOULD BE USEFUL:
- A. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE SUBJECT IN BERLIN?
- B. IS THE MISSION OF THE VIEW THAT THE SEK IS AS CAPABLE AS THE BGS OF DEALING WITH THE SITUATIONS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH L (B) AND (C) SUPRA?
- C. IF NOT, ARE ALLIED RESOURCES AVAILABLE WHICH CAN OBVIATE THE NEED FOR THE BGS IN THESE SITUATIONS? CONFIDENTIAL

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 $10. \ \ ACTION \ REQUESTED: \ SEE \ PARAGRAPH \ 9. \\ STOESSEL$

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X Capture Date: 01 jan 1994 Channel Indicators: n/a

Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Concepts: BORDER GUARDS Control Number: n/a Copy: SINGLE Draft Date: 26 jan 1978 Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960 Decaption Note: Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW

Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014 Disposition Event:

Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BONN01478
Document Source: CORE

Document Unique ID: 00 Drafter: n/a

Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: X1 Errors: N/A

Expiration: Film Number: D780039-0630 Format: TEL

From: BONN

Handling Restrictions: n/a

Image Path: ISecure: 1

Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780121/aaaaarme.tel

Line Count: 264 Litigation Code IDs: Litigation Codes:

Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: b74909e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Office: ACTION EUR

Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a

Previous Chambel indicators. The Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a Reference: 77 USBERLIN 3230, 77 USBERLIN 3131, 77 BONN 18889, 75 BONN 5137, 75 BONN 5837

Retention: 0

Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Content Flags:

Review Date: 05 aug 2005 Review Event: Review Exemptions: n/a **Review Media Identifier:** Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

SAS ID: 3712618 Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: PRESENCE OF BGS IN BERLIN TAGS: PORS, PGOV, WB, GC, BQG, AKB

To: USBERLIÑ Type: TE

vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/b74909e0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Review Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014